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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No 960236CA 
vs. 
DAVID PARKER : Argument Priority 15 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Defendant appeals from a judgment dated March 15, 1996 
awarding the Plaintiff the sum of $2,746.47, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 7.35% per annum from the date of said 
judgment until paid in full, entered in the Third Judicial Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department by the Honorable 
Michael L. Hutchings. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Question: Can this Court review the Trial Judge's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, where the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are supported by the evidence and not 
objected to by the Defendant? 
Standard of Review Findings of Fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins v. Johnson 738 P2d 652, 654 (Utah App 1987) 
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2. Question: May the Trial Court allocate a portion of fault 
to a person, who is neither named as a defendant in the action nor 
a person immune from suit, who contributed to the alleged injury? 
Standard of Review Questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena 869 P 2d 932 (1994) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Applicable provisions are reproduced in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff brought a subrogation action asserting the 
insured's claim against Defendant for property damages to the 
insured's vehicle. On the 8th day of February, 1996, the case was 
tried to the Court, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, presiding. 
After receiving testimony from witnesses for the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in 
the amount of $2,746.47 plus interest. The Defendant timely 
appealed the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 19th of June, 1995, the Plaintiff's insured, John 
Schirack was driving east in Big Cottonwood canyon, near Storm 
Mountain. (R-ll) This area was posted as a slide area. As the 
insured came to a curve, he noticed a rock in the road. The 
insured turned to the right and hit one of the rocks coming down 
the hill. The insured drove further along the highway, 
approximately a hundred years, where he stopped. He noticed a 
large trail of fluid coming from his vehicle. (R.-21-22) 
A short time thereafter, Officer Bench arrived at the scene. 
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(R-22) Officer Bench testified that he arrived quickly at the 
scene because he was told someone was pushing rocks onto the 
highway. (R-6) When Officer Bench arrived at the scene he saw 
three individuals up on the slide area. They had gotten themselves 
in a precarious position, and in so doing, had kicked several rocks 
down onto the road, one of which had done damage to the insured's 
vehicle. (R-6) 
The Defendant came down to the road and told Officer Bench 
that he was a guide. The Defendant stated that he was guiding the 
other two and he was the one responsible for the accident (R-6,8-
9,16,25) The Defendant admitted that he'd been in the area before 
that time. (R-7) Officer Bench noticed there were several rocks on 
the road. (R-8) 
The Defendant specifically requested that Officer Bench not 
charge the other two people he was guiding. (R-9) 
The Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant for the sum of $2,746.47. The Court found that by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was the guide, 
that he was responsible for the rock slide, he certainly was the 
leader, the one that led out, began to move across the rock slide 
area. 
The Defendant had driven to this area many times, he knew that 
it was a rock slide area, he referred to it as probably the worst 
rock slide area in that particular canyon. He was very familiar 
with the road and very familiar with the fact that rocks could fall 
from that particular mountain area on to the road. 
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The Court was persuaded by the fact that the Defendant talked 
to the Officer, made a statement to the Officer that he was 
responsible for what had taken place. The word "guide" was used, 
whether or not - I'm not exactly certain beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he used the word "guide", but by a preponderance of the 
evidence, I find the word "guide" was his word that was utilized or 
stated at this particular time. 
There were clearly a number of rocks on the road down in that 
area, 15 or 2 0 rocks. The rocks didn't all fall at the same time, 
and in the estimation of the Court, when the Defendant began to 
lead this expedition, I mean, there are certain risks associated 
with it, there are certain duties associated with it, the duty to 
climb across the mountain without causing any rock slide, or 
causing rocks to fall on to the mountain road. Certainly, he knew 
about the fact that there were rock slides in the area, 
nevertheless, he undertook to pursue the matter. 
At the specific request of Counsel for the Defendant, the 
Trial Judge included a finding that there's no pecuniary interest 
between Mr. Parker and the other people that were involved in the 
climb itself. 
The way I'm apportioning negligence is zero percent to the 
driver of the vehicle, 100 percent to Mr. Parker in this particular 
case. 
Well, what I mean by this is, Mr. Parker did not bring anyone 
else in on this case; I mean, he didn't file any third-party 
complaints against anyone else. He basically stands here alone. (R 
4 
- Judges Ruling pg's 5-9) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. The findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were supported by oral evidence 
presented at trial and are not clearly erroneous. The Trial Judge 
did not commit reversible error in refusing to allocate fault to 
non defendants under Section 78-27-39 UCA. Further, the Trial 
Judge committed no error in holding the Defendant as the leader of 
the group. Liability under Section 78-27-38 UCA does not depend on 
whether there was a pecuniary interest between members of the 
hiking party. 
ARGUMENT 
The point argued by the Defendant on appeal that there was no 
pecuniary interest between the Defendant and the other hikers was 
raised only in the closing argument by Counsel for the Defendant. 
It was not raised either in the pleadings and was not presented to 
the Trial Court. This Court in the case of US Xpress, Inc v. Utah 
State Tax Commission 886 P 2d 1115 (Utah App 1994) held that absent 
extraordinary circumstances or plain error, issues cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal. This Court should not consider 
whether there was a pecuniary interest between the Defendant and 
the other two hikers, because other than in closing argument, it 
was not presented to the Trial Court for resolution. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
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"Finding of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of witnesses.,f 
The Trial Court in announcing its decision stated that after 
hearing the evidence in the case, I rule in favor of the Plaintiff 
and against the Defendant for the sum of $2,746.47. 
I'm convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Defendant was,you might say the guide, that he was responsible for 
the rock slide, he certainly was the leader, the one that led out, 
began to move across the rock slide area. (R- Judges Ruling P.5) 
Mr. Parker had driven in this area many times, he knew that it 
was a - a rock slide area, he referred to it as probably the worst 
rock slide area in that particular canyon. He was very familiar 
with the road and very familiar with the fact that rocks could fall 
from the -- from that particular mountain area onto the road. 
In face, you know, I'm persuaded by the fact that he talked to 
the officer, made a statement to the officer, that he was 
responsible for what had taken place. The word "guide" was used, 
whether or not -- I'm not exactly certain beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he used the word "guide", but at least by a preponderance of 
the evidence, I find that the word "guide" was his word that was 
utilized or stated at this particular time." (R- Judges Ruling P. 6) 
These findings were supported by the testimony of Officer 
Bence, and John Schirack that the Defendant admitted he was the 
guide, that he was guiding the other two and was responsible for 
the accident. (R- 6,8-9,16,25) 
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Further, the Defendant specifically requested that Officer 
Bench not charge the other two people he was guiding. (R - 9) 
The Defendant, on appeal, argues that the Court committed 
reversible error in not apportioning fault to non parties. In so 
arguing the Defendant quotes Section 78-27-38(4) UCA as follows: 
"In determining the proportionate fault attributable to 
each defendant, the fact finder may, and when requested 
by a party shall, consider the conduct of any person who 
contributed to the alleged injury regardless of whether 
the person is a person immune from suit or a defendant in 
the action and may allocate fault to each person seeking 
recovery, to each defendant, and to any person immune 
from suit who contributed to the alleged injury." 
The Defendant, in quoting the above section, ignores the 
remaining portion of the paragraph, which limits allocation of 
fault to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to 
any person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
This interpretation of the applicable section was recognized 
by the trial judge when he found: 
"Well, what I mean by that is, Mr. Parker did not bring 
anyone else in on this case; I mean, he didn't file any 
third-party complaints against anyone else. He basically 
stands alone." (R - Judges Ruling P. 8) 
At the specific request of the Counsel for the Defendant the 
trial court included a finding that there was no pecuniary interest 
between Mr. Parker and the other people that were involved in the 
climb itself. (R - Judges Ruling P. 8) 
No where in the Utah Liability Reform Act is required a 
finding of pecuniary interest as a prerequisite to finding fault. 
Section 78-27-37(2) UCA defines fault as follows: 
11
 (2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
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injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach 
of express or implied warranty of a product, products 
liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a 
product." 
In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v Johnson 
738 P. 2d 652, 655 (Utah App 1987) the finding of a pecuniary 
interest in a joint enterprise was necessary before holding the 
owner of the vehicle liable for damages. The case of Mukasey v. 
Aaron 438 P. 2d 702 (Utah 1968) involved the application of the 
former Utah Guest Statute - Section 41-9-1, UCA, which was declared 
unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court in Malan v. Lewis 693 P. 
2d 681 (Utah 1984) . This former statute required a finding of 
pecuniary interest before recovery for injury to a guest was 
allowable. There is no such requirement in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. These findings of fact and conclusions 
of law were supported by credible evidence presented at the trial. 
Under Section 78-27-38(4) UCA the trial judge may not allocate a 
portion of the liability to non defendants, whom the Defendant 
elected not to interplead as third party defendants. There is no 
requirement of Utah law that the trial judge must find a pecuniary 
interest between the Defendant and the other two hikers before he 
may assess liability to the Defendant. Therefore, the Plaintiff 
requests the Court of Appeals to affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
8 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W 
1996. 
day of September, 
CHAD B. MCKAY 
Attorney for Appelle 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Brief to Rodney R. Parker, Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor, Post Office 
Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, Attorney for Appellant, 
postage prepaid this ID day of September, 1996 
^ 
ChacT B. McKay 
Attorney for Appelle 
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STATUTES AND RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 52 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
instructions. Morgan v. Quailhrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
Writ ten ins t ruc t ions . 
—Fai lure to tender . 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he couhft not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. (Toward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen. 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
•1964); Memrnott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J. 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 <1971>; Flynn v W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co.. 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P 2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974i; Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1975»; Lamkin v. Lynch. 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v. 
Carter. 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
$ 1077 et seq. 
C.J .S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §ss 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jurv thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jurv thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell propertv, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51. and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Trial ®=> 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
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I i I AH R[ ri E S OF • i :xv 11 1 >ROCED[ IRE Rule 52 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) A m e n d m e n t . Upon motion of a party made not later than 1.0 Jays after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(o Waiver of findings of fact am* conclus ions of law. Except in actions 
f.ir di\urv<\ fimiin-- >>i '.i.-t MIKI r,.p.i Uisions of law may be waived by the 
pjrt ie> f u an issue of tact: 
• 1 i) v (1 efa1111 o r b y f. i . . . -.;.-, ' . p o e a r a t t h e I,ria 1; 
> l' h \ ru r .M-n l ii w i it mj.'., liieci m t h e c a u s e ; 
• .'.) \>\ o i \ i l c u r i - c i . l n i o p e n (••".:'! •< n t e r c d w :!-.<• n - m u t c s . 
i A m e n d . M ! r . f ' tecu\< J a n . 1, l i i . ^7 . 1 
Compiler ' s Notes. -— This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule o\'5. 
NOTES T' " Ml " I' I IS 
A NA LYSIS Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
Adoption. When made. 
—Abandonment of contract. —Overruling or vacation. 
—Advisory verdict. Another district judge. 
—Breach of contract. Lack of notice. 
—Child custody. Child custody awards 
—Contempt. Criminal cases. 
—Credibility of witnesses. Criminal contempt. 
—Denial of motion. Effect. 
—Divorce decree modifications. — Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Easement -Relation to pleadings. 
—Evidentiary disputes. Failure to object to findings. 
—Juvenile action. How findings entered. 
—Material issues. Judicial review. 
Harmless error —Equity cases. 
—Submission In pn-wuhn^ pails --Standard of review. 
Court's diMTefhin - --Conclusions of law. 
—Water dispute. Criminal cases. 
Findings of Mil n in i -•- -Criminal trials. 
Amendment. Findings of tacts by jury. 
—Motion. intent.. 
Conformance with original findings. Juvenile proceedings. 
New trial. Purpose of rule. 
Notice of appeal. Stipulations. 
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78-27-33 JUDICIAL CODE 170 
TilSCilfeger Kill* M" • ' l" ' '< .i)vi»\-,i- | n r i h e . .;. i I ' t ' l .UK'Si ' t "DI p . . ^f)7 i'" S i i p p "-()•' 
883 F. Supp iW)M it ("tab !•••*". Utah 1994); Mori v Mon, MM; P::.; i.l-T.l 
cm 
Ct. App. 1995). 
• ih l tAi , REFERENCES 
A-L.R. - Execution, out.-ide -»i h*1
 (;ji. of jurisdiction over nonresident guarantors under 
guaranty of ohligal ions under contiart to bo "long-arm" statute or rule of forum, 28 
performed within forum state as conferiirm A i, k r>th (JO * 
7o-Ai-oii. MatemtwH ut • ivjurvd p e r s o n — ?T^len inadmis-
sible as e\ ide 
Except as otherwise pn-vidt1*, \rt this act. ;\i\y statemei it, either written c u: 
oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while 
this person is enuiiiied in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of injuries 
sustained in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a person 
whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except 
a law enforcement officer, shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil 
proceeding brought by or against the injured person for damages sustained as 
a result, of the occurrence, unless: 
t l 1 a written verbatim copy of the statement has been h-:\ >\\\:\ ••:-• 
ed party at the time the statement was taken; and 
.-/ the statement has not been disavowed in writing within liiteen days 
of the date of the statement or within fifteen days after the date of the 
injured person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitnr'11"- •'" " K : - ;-
the person has been confined, whichever date is later. 
H i s t o r y L. 1973, vh. 208, $ 2; 1992. <-n. :>0t .section designations by deleting ''• ' '" h<:m ':;< 
§ 180, beginning and substituting numln-r design-
A m e n d m e n t Nott\-:. - I <;•• 1992 amend- tions for lower-case letters. 
nif nt. tMleciive Ann I 1.7 \U92, n'visod lb.- ^ub-
78-27-u ^. i^elease, se t t lement or s tatement by injured per 
son — When re sc i s s ion or cl i savowal provisions 
iiiappn.-.t*'?--. 
This act shall not apply in the following circumstances: 
If at least five days prior to signing the settlement agreement, liability 
release, or statement, the injured person has signed a statement in 
writing indicating his willingness that the settlement agreement, liability 
release, or statement be given or signed. 
I h s t o i y J,. I'iV.j. r h . 20S. ^ ;;; 1J)1*2, t h. .'JO, ment, cileclive A{>ni lf, > l\)\V2t h-leted %*. 
§ 181. former subsection (1) designatj"! .• ih" IHKTI 
Amorulm.' j ' t N,. - • : - v : " 1 m i w o f t b e ^eition 
78-2'* . n i b i ^ ^ i. . . ivcuve unii 
As used in Section.- 37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant .s a person, other than a person immune ;rom suit 
as defined in Subsection »3;. who is claimed to be liable because of fault to 
any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty a a , or omission. 
proximately causing or contributii lg to injury or damages sustained by a 
[71 MISCELI AM-'DI'S PirAdSIuNb 7H-27'll7 
person seeking recovery, in*
 4 . .uence in all JUS m.-giuus, tumiiuu-
tory negligence, assumptio Avici liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty of a pi^im :. j.i^.jiji-i ...I h \ . an-! misuse, modification 
or abuse of a product. 
{o} "Person immune from smf nit-ai 
UU an emplover immune j:Mi:i -• •; ^ndor Title '35, Chapter ; :: .:; 
and 
L ' a goveramenial cntn\
 (ir- guvernmental employiie niiiiniiii: i'roni 
suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own bebai- • >• \u iia',:" .(' . mt: .T :'br ubo!' :i is 
TmMiorized fo xr{ as legal repressi ial i.. 
Defini t ions IKHVct^ t- J u l y j , ]»{)7J. 
Aw ?/>-/'J m Sections 7 <J-'27-117 ihnjmji
 th „ t \:\: 
\ ) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit 
as defined in Subsection (3), who is claimed to be liable because of fault to 
any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery including negligence in all its degrees, contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, 
or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person i m m u n e it m i : M J I I mi ;<nj . - . 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 3;1A, Chapter 3, 
Workers 'Compensator Act, <>r Charier 'a. L'tah < Voupa1. i-Mia! Dis-
ease Act; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental einployee immune from 
suit pursuant to Title b3, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act, 
1) "Person seeking recovery'1 means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized h- :<^ as leuml representative. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-.'*7, r i iaek-d lis- C d) and made related and stylistic changes. 
1986, ch. 199, § 1; 1994, c:h. 21; I, § 2; 1990, The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, 
eli. 240, § 374. substituted the code citation in Subsection 
Amendment Not*-s. T;-, 1991 .U,„-M}
 (;j){a) for 'Title 35, Chapter 1 or 2." 
ment, e!T- .•!•-.-• Ma\ 2 1991, added Suhseciion 
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('iu-i> i. .ill. nvfst Const: .. i-^iii.cr, 886 
P.:!d 9i: / . 'Lib Ci. App 199 ! -
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I Jiali I ,aw Review. A Step Backwards in u it v. Prr-seni and Mewiinl, WVJ'l H Y.l\ L l'--v. 
Products Liability Law: The Utah Supreme i ! \ : 
Court and Comment K, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 101. A.L.R. At-;• ii• d-iln\ -4 u>mp..! .ih-.e rnvh 
Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Non- gence doctrine to actions based on n<-;du-;-.-nt 
party Joint Tortfeasors, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 444. misrepresentation, 22 A.L.R.5th 46 I. 
Bfigliaiii Young Law Review. — Survey of Validity and effect of "Mary Carter" or sinii-
11 tali Strict Products 1liability Law: From llabii lar agreement setting maximum liability of one 
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r o d ft |c i -< t Ki-: 
t inruisiii > \r 
ifiici^ii-fin^ cotoi lleasui, 12 A.L.R.5th 
78-27-.4$S. C o m p a r a f r . :• 'H^Iigeru *% 
that person. 
(2) A person si-eluiip nrtiviM; • -MV IT-C.IVI-I /• mi any UL :. :.-».:. ...,; .. 
defendants who^e fault, c-imhined with (he fault of persons immune fn-m suit, 
exceeds the fault of the person seeking HMMUPTV prior 1o anv n-'iiln< a: inn nf 
fault made under Subsection 78-27-39C2). 
(3) No defendant, is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of I lie pronortion of fault attributed in that defendant iinder Section 
78-27-19. 
Mi (a) in determining wie pmpnrn. . • ' i-;.t attributable to each defen-
dant, the fact finder may, and wht-u >-. Muesied by a party shall, consider 
the conduct of any person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless 
of whether the person is a person immune from suit or a defendant in the 
action and may allocate fault to each person seeking recovery, to each 
defendant, and. to any person immi ine from si lit who eonf ribi ited to the 
alleged injury. 
ibi Any fault allocated to a person immune from <\u\ is u.-nsider^d only 
to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and a 
defendant and may not subject the person inn mine from suit to any 
; iah i i i t v, base • I - . a! ;• n oi l a in Mi v o i l i e r ;u*1'«. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 7H-27-.J8. -Mi.n-t^d i • 1 
1986. ch. 199, § 2; 1994, eh. 221, § 3. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . -- The 1994 am- ' 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, added the subsec-
tion designations and added Subsection (4); 
••••WOte St ibs iT ' . idh ( 2 ' . v-h-i :. L,\:_, . .-
 % "He 
may recover from any defendant or group of 
defendants whose fault exceeds his own"; added 
the section citation in Subsection (3); and made 
stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Apportion nioi 
Breach of wai t *:-.•>. 
Causation. 
Contractual indemnity provision. 
Im pleader. 
Open and obvious dang«M 
Proportion of fault. 
Cited. 
A p p o r t i o n m e n t . 
The purpose and intent of this act require 
tha t a jury account for the relative proportion of 
fault of a plaintiff's employer that may have 
caused or contributed to an accident, even 
though the employer is immune from suit. 
Apportionment of fault does not of itself subject 
the employer to civil liablity. Rather, the appor-
tionment process merely ensures that no defen-
dant is held liable to any claimant for an 
amount of damages in excess of the percentage 
of fault attributable to that defendant. Sullivan 
v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993); 
Dahl v. Kerbs Constr. Corp., 853 P.2d 887 (Utah 
1993); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 
P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). 
B r e a c h of w a r r a n t y . 
A court shall consider a plaintiff's compara-
tive negligence and comparative assumption of 
the risk in determining liability for a claim of 
breach of warranty. Interwest Constr. v. 
Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Plaintiff's knowing acceptance of a defective 
product, and its subsequent modification and 
negligent operation of that product, will pre-
vent it from recovering damages for branch of 
express or implied warranty. Interwest Constr. 
v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
C a u s a t i o n . 
When a defendant is dismissed due to a 
determination of lack of fault as a matter of law,' 
the defendant is excluded from apportionment, 
which does not subject the remaining defend 
dants to liability for damages in excess of their 
proportionate fault. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain 
Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). 
C o n t r a c t u a l i n d e m n i t y p rov i s ion . 
The Liability Reform Act renders useleai 
indemnification for any tort liability other than! 
oiic's own; thus, a provision in an agreement 
i.;i MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-39 
'between a general contractor and yubcunh ac-
tor indemnifying the general contractor "from 
and against any and all loss, damage, injury, 
liability, and claims thereof... resulting from 
Sub-contractor's performance" indemnified the 
general contractor for liability arising from its 
own negligence. Ilealey v. J.B. Sheet Metal, 
Inc., 261 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Implead er. 
Defendant was permitted to implead a thud 
party defendant in order to determine appor-
tionment of fault. Tietz v Blackner, 157 V U I) 
510 ID. Utah 1994). 
Open a n d obv ious dange r . 
The presence of an "open and obvious" danger 
is merely one factor for the trier of fact to 
consider when assessing the liability of the 
defendant in a strict liability case — it does not 
operate as a complete bar to the injured party's 
recovery. House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.^d 
542 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted, 899 
I'2d li!;U (Utah MWS) 
1'iopot Lion of fault . 
Since, under this section, third party plaintiff 
cannot be held liable for any amount in excess 
of the proportion of fault attributable to it, the 
fact finder must determine the proportion of 
fault (if any) attributable to third party (bleu 
dant. Brown v. Boyer-Washington lllvd 
Assocs., 856 F.2d 352 (Utah 1993). 
If a plaintiff's proportion of fault is less than 
I hat of a defendant, or group of defendants, the 
factfinder is required to determine "the per-
centage or proportion of fault attributable to 
each party seeking recovery and to each defen-
dant" and reduce the award of damages accord-
ingly, however, if a plaintiff's sfiare of fault 
exceeds defendant's, plaintiff recovers nothing. 
Interwest Constr. v. Palmei, 886 I'2d 92 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
Ci ted in WaJkei v Union Lac. 11.R., 
335 (Utah Ct. App 1992). 
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B r i g h a m Young Law Review. Suivey of 
1 Ttah Strict Products Liability Law. From Hahn 
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J I 73. 
Note, Sullivan v. Seoul a r Cram Co.. Appoj-
tioning the Fault of Immune Employers, 1994 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 187. 
A.L.K. — Modern status of rule imputing 
motor vehicle driver's negligence to passenger 
on joint venture theory, 3 A.L.R.5th 1. 
Comparative negligence: judgment allocating 
fault in action against less than all potential 
defendants as precluding subsequent action 
against parties not sued in original action, 1 
A.L.R.5th 753. 
Pioducts liability application of stncl liabil-
ity doctrine to sellei of used produil, 9 
A.L.R.5th 1. 
Sufficiency of evidence to raise last clear 
chance doctrine in cases of automobile collision 
with pedestrian or bicyclist — modern cases, 9 
A.L.R.5th826. 
Legal malpractice: negligence or fa nil of < h 
ent as defense, 10 A.L.R.5th 828. 
Intentional provocation, contributoiy or com-
parative negligence, or assumption of risk as 
defense to action foi injury by dog, 11 A.L.K 5th 
127. 
Applicability of comparative negligence prin-
ciples to intentional torts, 18 A.L.K.5«h 525. 
VH-U'rf III). S e p a r a t e s p e c i a l vercImi Is. iiiii I (.ill i l . im.in.r'i aiiiMil 
proportion of fault. 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, diuict the 
jury, if* any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to 
each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any person immune 
from suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
{2} (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all 
persons immune from suit is less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce 
that percentage or proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percent-
age or proportion of fault to the other parties in proportion to the 
percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to each party by Hie 
fact finder. After this reallocation, cumulative fault shall equal 100% v, il h 
the persons immune from suit being allocated no fault. 
lb) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all 
persona immune from suit is 40% or more, that percentage or proportion 
78-27-40 J l JDK JIM .CODE 
of r n u u < u t n » • <f < "! •• ; -;.-. • J ..* -:--; be reduce'' ;j)d* 
Subsection ' J f t 
fc) M) The jury may not n an - •; ::.< » tv< t wj any real! 
under Subsection (2). 
•II1 The jiirv may be advised that fault attributed U: person; 
immune !Vn:n . ,-• -:."•• --•l-.rv *1^ *•'' r iU-- ;•-. • . - -eekin-
recovery. 
(3) A person immune from suit may not b> JH-M IIJII-IC, .;-* *v. •. • n. 
allocation, of fault, i n this or any other action. 
Uis-i»r\ * 1^">.J "* .. - ' ' lmmuiio ftom suit who contributed to the al-
i9Hi>. r}\, 199. $ •); . = '.- *T ... . . . lognd injury" and made a related change in 
Amendn icn t Notos. — The 1994 amend- Subset-fun- 11), and added Subsections (2) and 
rient , olTprm" Mav 2. 1994, added the Subsec- i'3). 
t.nT-, , 1 i .if»«'^n,ip'*n. ,JIU1P<1 ''.ind to :mv person 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
<'itpfl m Jnt» jrwest I ' ons i r i- t 'jih'ior. ^80 
7S-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of 
'*;uih No contribution. 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant 
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion 
of the damages euuivali-nt Ju ?he percentage or pr:>pi?rt ion of fault. :Uirii--;t.-i5 to 
tha t defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not entuled i,- v-onlribulion iroin any other perso... 
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action 
against any person immune from suit to recover damages resultlug from the 
allocation of fault under Section 78-27-38. 
His to ry : C, 1953, 78-27-40, cnactecl by I ,. inent, effective May 2, 1994, added the subsec-
1986, ch . 199, § 4; 1994, ch. 221, § 5. tion designations, added Subsection (3), and 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1994 amend- made a stylistic change. 
A p p o r t i o n m e n t . subject the employer to civil liability, but en-
The intent of the Liability Reform-Vi, $^ , >i sures that no defendant is held liable to any 
27-37 to 78-27-43, was to require that a jury claimant for an amount of damages in excess of 
account for the relative proportion of fault of a the percentage of fault attributable t* that 
plaintiff's employer in causing an accident. defendant. Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
Apportionment of an employer's fault does not 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). 
78-27-41 J oinder of defendants. 
(1) A person seeking recovery, or anv < i1>i< i,•:• u . ^ 11w i^  < i JMS U to the 
litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordant- with the Utah Utiles of Civil 
Procedure, any person other than a person hun-me from suit who may have 
caused or contributed to the injury or damage lor which recovery is sought, for 
the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault 
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a defendant, > 
may be allocated to a person immune from suit solely for the pu 
accurately determining the fault of the person seeking recover) and a defen-
RECORD 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
:-.Y MR. McKA'Y : . ' • 
Q! On or about June 19th of 1:994, were you called to 
A Yes I was. 
Q Do you remember who made that phone call? 
A I don't remember who made the phone call. It had 
something to do with rocks being pushed down onto the road. 
" i i i i I • :! i • :l \ • : i i r espond t: : til ie s:i te? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q A i i d :: a i i } D i i t: e J ] i i s A 1 i a t: i i a p p e n e d :i f: a i i \ ; t: 1 :i :i r i g ? 
A W h e i I I arrived at the scene, there was, I believe, 
three individuals up on the slide area. They had got 
themselves in a precarious position and in doing so, had 
kicked several rocks down onto the road, and one of those 
)ck:s ha :i :Ic ne damage t:< I be] :i eve :i t: • as a 1; an, i t: had 
done damage to the transmission, I believe :i t was. 
i \ i id a t tl: lat: t i i i: ie :i i I t a 1 k::i i: lg wi t l i : i ie : f tl: ie 
i nd i v I dua 1 s , I don ' t remember t he name,, he s a i d t hat he wa s a 
, -i i d e a n d 11 I a t 1: i • a w a s g i l :i d i i i g 11 I e < ::»11 i e :i : t: , • :> a i i d I: :i E " a s t: 1 i e o n e 
responsible for the accident. 
Q Okay Did you prepare a report about the ii icIdents 
oi that day? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay A n d d :i • :1 ;; : •} i 1 la ,; ' e a i l iuppoi: t:n in :i t \ !:: : • t a ] 1 : ; - i tl: I 
the individual? 
A Yes. I talked with both individuals. 
3 | Q Okay. You don't remember--what did you--you talked 
4 | to both individuals, meaning the driver of the car and the 
5 I person who claimed responsibility? 
A Yes. 
7 I Q And he stated he was a guide? 
8 A Yes. He did. 
9 Q Did you talk with the other two people on the 
10 mountain? 
11 A It seems like I did briefly, but I don't remember 
12 what the conversation was. 
13 Q Okay. Did he indicate that the person, I guess the 
14 person who said he was a guide, was that Mr. Parker? 
15 A I believe that's the name, yes. 
16 Q Was--did he indicate that he'd been in the area 
17 before that time? 
18 A Yes. He did. 
19 Q Do you remember what he indicated about that? 
20 A He indicated that he had tried to climb the mountain 
21 from a different area, I believe which was more to the west, 
22 and in doing so, they couldn't get to where they wanted to get 
23 and so they had gone around this other way. 
24 Q Okay. Did you witness them causing rocks to come 
25 onto the road? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q Did you--how did you get them down from the 
mountain? 
4 I A Well, it seems like it--it took a little working and 
5 | I, you know, I asked him to be very careful and not--try not 
6 I to kick any rocks, but they was in such a position that that 
7 | was almost impossible. And he said, give me a minute, I 
8 | believe, and then they just worked their way back down and 
then down to the road. 
10 I Q Okay. And were there rocks on the road? 
11 | A Yes, there was. 
12 I Q What--do you remember the size of those rocks? 
13 A Not for sure. I remember they was kind of like 
14 medium size, they wasn't large. They would be probably, oh, I 
15 don't know, maybe 12 inches at the most. It's hard to say, I 
16 really don't remember the size. 
17 Q Okay. Did you have a chance to speak with the 
18 driver of the vehicle? 
19 A Yes. I did. 
20 Q Do you remember what was said, if anything? 
21 A Oh, it seems like--seems like his statement was is 
22 that he was just--he had been coming around and he seen 
23 several of the rocks on the road and in trying to avoid them, 
24 he had run over one. 
25 Q Okay. And you indicated earlier that that had 
1 I caused damaged to his vehicle? 
2 I A Yes, it had. 
3 QQ Were you aware of the extent of the damage? 
4 J A Well, we knew that it was transmission fluid, I 
believe there was transmission fluid on the road. And the--
6 I well, it seems like the vehicle was inoperable, but I can't be 
7 positive about that. 
8 J Q Are you aware as to whether a tow truck was called? 
A I don't remember. 
10 I Q Did you--now, you--you stated that Mr. Parker 
11 admitted that it was his fault? 
12 A Yes. He did. 
13 Q And did he ask you not to charge the other two 
14 people he was guiding? 
15 A Yes. He did. 
16 MR. PARKER: Objection, leading. 
17 THE COURT: Excuse me? I'm sorry. 
18 THE WITNESS: He told me he was the responsible one 
19 and that he was the guide and he was--
20 THE COURT: Overruled. 
21 THE WITNESS: --guiding them across the--the face 
22 there. 
23 Q (By Mr. McKay) Okay. And were citations issued to 
24 anyone? 

























Q How frequently do you drive up and down Big 
Cottonwood Canyon? 
A Oh, probably--it depends; summertime, maybe three or 
four times. Maybe--it--it varies, sometimes I'll be in that 
canyon quite a bit, sometimes, you'll only make one trip 
through that canyon. 
Q When you say that three or four times, that would be 
per day, is that what you're talking about? 
A Right. On--yes. On--it's hard to say because some 
days you will go up and down three or four times, other days, 















Where, exactly, did this accident happen? 
It happened on the Storm Mountain slide area, just-
dairy bridge. 
Is that that area where there's a large rock hill to 
side of the road? 
Yes, sir. 
And that's a--that area is posted as a slide area, 
Yes, sir. 
That's the Storm Mountain slide area sign? 
Yes, sir. 
And there's also a falling rock sign right before 
, isn't there? 
There is. 
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Q State your name and address for the Court, please. 
A John Schirack, S-c-h-i-r-a-c-k. Address is 1842 
North Valley View Drive, Layton 84040. That is a different 
address from when--when this accident happened. 
Q Okay. On June 19th, were you in the vicinity of 
Storm Mountain? 
A I was. 
Q Okay. Can you tell us what you were doing there, 
who you were with, where you were going? 
A Well, there were six of us, my wife, our daughter, 
her husband and their two kids. We were going up to breakfast 
at the restaurant, Silver Fork — 
Q Okay. 
A --Silver Fork Restaurant up Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
QQ And as you were traveling up the canyon, you can 
around the--well, tell me what happened immediately prior to 
the accident? 
A Well, we were driving up--I was driving up the--
there, there's a curve, had to come around the curve and there 
was a lot of brush right there, you couldn't see for a little 
bit, but after I was able to see, there was one big boul--big 
rock out in the center of the street and there were--I started 
to turn to the right to miss that, and then I noticed out of 
/ /*» /N -1 \ ~ » < ^ 0 ~» Vl ,1 "1 
22 
1 1 the corner of my eye, numerous rocks coming down. I don't 
2 ] know which one I hit, but it was one of these that was rolling 
3 I down, and I had to pull forward a little further because the 
4 I rock--there was such a slide of rocks coming down, I wanted--
5 didn't want to stop the car out in the path of the rocks. So, 
6 I went approximately a hundred yards beyond where the damage 
7 was done. 
8 Q Okay. Then what happened? 
9 A Well, I got out of the car and I immediately noticed 
10 a big trail of some kind of--of fluid, from where the accident 
11 happened up to where I stopped, so I knew there was damage. 
12 And about, I--I would say about three minutes later, Officer 
13 Bench came, and he--he stated that he'd been told by somebody 
14 down below, at the foot of the canyon, that someone was 
15 kicking rocks up there onto the road, so that he was on his 
16 way up there at the time this accident happened, that's why he 
17 arrived so quick after it happened. We had no way of 
18 contacting him, he just happened to show up. 
19 Q Okay. Did you observe what his actions were? 
20 A Whose actions? Bench? 
21 Q Officer Bench, yes. 
22 A Well, he just--at first, I kinda signaled to him and 
23 then he--he started to come up toward me, that hundred yards 
24 or so and then these rocks kept coming and he--he yelled up at 
25 the fellows up on the mountain, you know, to stop whatever 
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL JUDGE' FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Court to consider that. 
If the Court believes that there--that Mr. Parker 
specifically was more than 50 percent at fault himself, and I 
don't think that the evidence establi-shed that at all. I 
5 I think that the most you could say is that somebody up there 
6 | did it, but we don't know who, the--the plaintiff's evidence 
7 | is that good, the defendant's evidence is clearly that Mr. 
Parker did not knock the rock down, although it's possible 
9 | that someone else in the group may have. 
10 I THE COURT: Thank you. 
11 I Response? 
12 MR. McKAY: Just quickly, your Honor. 
13 (Mr. McKay's rebuttal argument not requested to be 
14 transcribed.) 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
16 After hearing the evidence in the case, I rule in 
17 favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum 
18 of $2,746.47. 
19 I'm convinced by a preponderance of the evidence 
20 that the defendant was, you might say the guide, that he was 
21 responsible for the rock slide, he certainly was the leader, 
22 the one that led 'out, began to move across the rock slide 
23 area. 
24 The fact that--that there was some publication here 
25 that the defendant relied upon to climb in the rock slide area 
6 
1 I really is not very persuasive to the Court at all. Certainly 
2 | doesn't obviate any liability in the estimation of the Court. 
Mr. Parker had driven in this area many times, he 
knew that it was a--a rock slide area, he referred to it as 
5 | probably the worst rock slide area in that particular canyon. 
6 I He was very familiar with the road and very familiar with the 
7 fact that rocks could fall from the--from that particular 
8 mountain area on to the road. 
9 In fact, you know, I'm persuaded by the fact that he 
10 talked to the officer, made a statement to the officer that he 
11 was responsible for what had taken place. The word "guide" 
12 was used, whether or not--I'm not exactly certain beyond a 
13 reasonable doubt that he used the word "guide", but at least 
14 by a preponderance of the evidence, I find that the word 
15 "guide" was his word that was utilized or stated at this 
16 particular time. 
17 The amount of damage appears in the estimation of 
18 the Court to be reasonable. The defense, it's true, has 
19 stated--presented some evidence to the Court that perhaps a 
2 0 lower sum would be more reasonable, but I'm not persuaded by a 
21 preponderance of the evidence that it would be more 
22 reasonable. It's a preponderance standard as I weigh that 
23 out, as I view credibility of the witnesses and the 
24 credibility of the evidence, it appears that this estimate 
25 I made by Farmers is a reasonable estimate. The--the owner of 
7 
1 I the vehicle, himself, can estimate damage; in a round-about 
2 way, that was done, not very direct, but somewhat round-about, 
3 and the figure seems, in the estimation of the Court to be 
4 reasonable. 
5 Regarding the--the reasonableness of Mr. Schirack's 
6 I driving, it appears to the Court that he exercised due caution 
and care, that he was reasonable; could he have done a better 
job in avoiding the collision? Perhaps. Perhaps a more 
experienced driver or a professional driver would have driven 
10 | it a little bit differently, but it appears to the estimation 
11 of the Court that Mr. Schirack acted reasonably in the way 
12 that he drove in this particular situation. 
13 There were clearly a number of rocks on the road 
14 down in that area, 15 or 20 rocks. The rocks didn't all fall 
15 at the same time, and in the estimation of the Court, when the 
16 defendant began to lead this expedition, I mean, there are 
17 certain risks associated with it, there are certain duties 
18 associated with it, the duty is to climb across the--the 
19 mountain without causing any rock slide or causing rocks to 
20 fall on to the mountain. Certainly, he knew about the fact 
21 that there were rock slides in the area; nevertheless, he 
22 undertook to pursue the matter. 
23 That's the rationale of the Court, those are the 
24 findings of the Court. 
o c
 ' Are there any additional findings that the defense 
a 
1 I or the prosecution of this case would like me to make, or any 
2 | further clarifications on conclusions of law? 
MR. McKAY: None that I'm aware of. 
4 I MR. PARKER: I'd like you to make a finding that 
5 there was no pecuniary interest involved in the--
6 THE COURT: I'll do that. There's no pecuniary 
7 J interest between Mr. Parker and the other people that were 
involved in the climb itself. That appears to be clear. 
The way I'm apportioning negligence is zero percent 
10 | to the driver of the vehicle, 100 percent to Mr. Parker in 
11 | this particular case. 
12 | And it's also my conclusion that under our joint 
13 I several liability law here in this State, that Mr. Parker 
14 would be responsible. 
15 MR. McKAY: Your Honor, if I may just say something 
16 about that? We don't have joint and several liability in this 
17 State. We have the--that--that act that requires people to--
18 to prove fault as to each person, we don't have joint several 
19 liability. 
2 0 THE COURT: Well, what I mean by that is, Mr. Parker 
21 did not bring anyone else in on this case; I mean, he didn't 
22 file any third-party complaints against anyone else. He 
23 basically stands here alone. 
™ I MR. McKAY: Well, it's--I don't think it's necessary 
9 
in the case. I mean, you--you can attribute fault to non-
2 j parties, that's very clear, and--
3 | THE COURT: Well, and I'm attributing fault, all I'm 
4 I saying is he-
MR. McKAY: And I'm just trying to keep my record 
6 I clear. 
7 THE COURT: --had a remedy--you can keep--sure. All 
8 I'm saying is, he had a remedy here that he did not avail 
9 himself of. He could have, I'm not saying he should have but 
10 for whatever reason, he did not avail himself of that remedy. 
11 But, as I apportion out fault here, I find a hundred percent 
12 for Mr. Parker. 
13 Is there any other statement that needs to be 
14 clarified by the Court for either side? 
15 I'll direct that the plaintiff prepare findings of 
16 fact and conclusions of law in conformity with the decision of 
17 the Court. Plaintiff is also granted costs associated with 
18 bringing the action. 
19 MR. McKAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Just file an affidavit of costs. 
21 MR. McKAY: I will. 
22 THE COURT: Or a memorandum of costs--
23 MR. McKAY: Thank you. 
24 THE COURT: --with the judgment form. 
25 I Thank you very much. 
